Political Parties in Federal Systems in Asia: Intraparty Democracy and Deliberation in Ethnic and Multiethnic Parties

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Introduction

The Asian region has been the site of considerable political and democratic reform over the past few decades. Several countries have undertaken democratic transitions, such as Indonesia, Nepal and South Korea. Others have reverted to forms of authoritarian rule or experienced a substantial democratic decline, for example Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Over the same period, ethnically divided countries in Asia have increasingly federalised. Nepal became a federation with its new constitution in 2015. Indonesia and the Philippines introduced constitutionally protected forms of decentralisation, while Myanmar established a federal structure. Political parties are integral to the success and failure of federal democratic change, particularly in deeply divided societies. This paper focuses in on one critical aspect of political parties in by looking at the differences between ethnic and multiethnic parties in federal countries in Asia, with a particular focus on internal democracy and deliberation.

The paper is based on a comparative analysis of ethnic and multiethnic political parties in four multiethnic federal systems in Asia, namely India, Malaysia, Myanmar and Nepal. It aims to discern if there are salient differences in internal institutional arrangements and practices between the two types. It tests hypotheses: that multiethnic parties have institutional conditions that are more conducive to democratic deliberation than ethnic parties; and that parties are more deliberative in practice at the local level than at the national level. Therefore, an ethnic party that is regional or local only, may also have a high level of deliberation in practice, and there is a causal link between deliberation and moderation. This would suggest that at the national/central level, political parties in deeply divided societies should be required or incentivised to be multiethnic (or at least cross-regional), while at the provincial and local levels, no such restrictions should apply.

There have been several important comparative studies of political parties in Asia (e.g. Croissant and Völkel 2012; Hicken and Kuhonta 2015; Manikas & Thornton 2003), but few seek to compare ethnic and multiethnic parties specifically. The most relevant are Horowitz (1985) and Reilly (2006), who advocate for multiethnic parties or coalitions, because ethnic parties "foster conflict" and create political instability. These views are consistent with scholars like Sartori (1976), Huntington (1991),

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and Gunter and Diamond (2001), who all favoured nonethnic or multiethnic parties. When it comes to federal systems, Bhattacharya (2010, Ch 5) provides a systematic analysis of political parties in federal systems in Asia, but spends little time on the difference between ethnic and multiethnic parties. My recent research (Breen 2022) demonstrates an emerging new model of federal democracy in Asia that combines ethnic and multiethnic parties.

In specific country context, Malaysia's and India's political parties have been well studied and have a long history (e.g. Weiss 2006; Ufen 2020; Kothari 1970, Kumar 2010; Schakel et al. 2019). Research on political parties in Nepal is distinctly lacking, with the only studies appearing from Krishna Hachhethu in 2002 and 2006. He argues that of the two major parties at the time, one (Nepali Congress (NC)) has relied more on charismatic leadership than party organisation, while the other CPN(UML) has relied on "organisation-building". "The NC's failure to motivate its rank and file through ideological and policy incentives further contributed to personality-orientation in the leadership, aggravating the unity and cohesion of the party." (Hachhethu 2006, 7). In Myanmar, research into its political parties is fledgling, just like the parties themselves. So it should not be a surprise that "For almost all parties the focus is first on attaining power (...) and then dealing with the development of policies later, if at all. Few parties have developed policy platforms setting out in detail what their overall political goals entail and in what ways they intend to achieve them. They rather remain as standalone political slogans, with an absence of sector-specific policies." (Kempel, Sun and Tun, 2015, p 14).

Ufen (2020) examines Malaysian political parties and identifies conditions that determine the type and strength of factionalism, most notably the extent of programmatic space. Ufen argues that parties that pursue a narrow agenda (e.g. ethnic interests only) will tend to have a more fixed or inflexible policy program and so it is more likely that candidates and potential candidates resort to clientelism and patronage to gain and maintain support. But as Bolin et al. (2017) show, when the parties are small (e.g. run in one or two provinces only) there is more opportunity for deliberation within the party, which to an extent can counterbalance the otherwise narrow agenda. Often, however, small ethnic parties are personality-based and so there is significant agency on account of party leaders and founders as to the amount of internal party democracy and deliberation permitted.

Political party systems have long been acknowledged as integral to the functioning of federal systems (e.g. Riker 1964) and the regulation of ethnic conflict (e.g. Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985). In ethnically divided societies, whether a party system of ethnic or multiethnic (or mixed) is particularly important. It is well established that multiethnic parties tend to be more centrist and moderating

2

and that ethnic parties can cause conflict (see Horowitz 1985, Reilly 2001; 2006). However, further work needs to be done on how internally democratic and deliberative parties are in practice, as although the outcomes may be moderate, and minority participants believe they have more influence within-party, the inner workings of different types of parties are not well known.

This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the difference formally and in practice between ethnic and multiethnic parties, the operation of which are integral to democratization, peace and stability in multiethnic countries in Asia. Section 2 of this paper describes the importance of intraparty democracy and the role and potential of deliberation within political parties to contribute to the moderation of politics in divided societies. Section 3 overviews the methodology, which comprised coding party statutes and interviews with members, officials and leaders of political parties. Section 4 gives the findings covering parties on paper and in practice, the differences between ethnic and multiethnic parties, and the quantitative outcomes which demonstrate a stark problem with many small ethnic parties.

Intra-party democracy and deliberation

Intra-party democracy is generally accepted as good for democracy as it offers another way of holding power-holders to account (see Bolin et al. 2017, p 3; Müller 2000). The National Democratic Institute (NDI – 2008) developed a set of 'Minimum Standards for the Democratic Functioning of Political Parties'. It includes elements related to members expressing their views freely, but little else with respect to internal democracy. Bolin et al. (2017) undertake quantitative comparison of intraparty democracy (IPD) – but do not cover any countries in Asia. Though they acknowledge omitted variables, they find that country-level factors are "more important than party-level factors" (27), but that smaller parties are associated with higher levels of internal party democracy. They also note that high levels of IPD can in fact undermine responsiveness to the electorate and policy and programmatic change. But research in internal democracy in political parties has been focussed on aggregative procedures, rather than deliberation (Wolkenstein 2018).

Federal systems have been identified as having inbuilt incentives for deliberation across different societal segments (Breen 2018, 2022). Although democratic deliberation is one way to improve policy-making, there remains debate about whether democratic deliberation can be effective in deeply divided societies because of a lack of suitable conditions. However, Institutional design can incentivise deliberation and create conditions that are more conducive to its practice and growth (Fishkin 2009), while it has been shown that deliberation can moderate ethnic division in deeply divided societies, if it occurs in a 'semi-detached' sphere and not attached to decision-making (Dryzek 2005).

3

I have argued elsewhere that political parties can add the extra layer of semi-detached deliberation as a means of moderating ethnic extremities (Breen 2018). Semi-detachment, in this context refers to a "decoupling of deliberation and decision-making" (Dryzek 2005). Multiethnic political parties provide a forum that can facilitate cross-ethnic exchange in a way that is once removed from decision-making while still retaining an important measure of accountability. At the party level, there are three requirements that incentivise deliberation and thus moderation. First, there is a requirement to reach a decision in a cross ethnic setting free from partisan interests (within-party); second there is a semi-detachment to, and accountability for, that decision, because it is not final and still subject to both executive and inter-party review (e.g. in parliament); and thirdly; the external tests or accountabilities of any such decisions also occur in a cross-ethnic setting, when external (non-party) institutions, including electoral systems, are also inclusive. Further, without the direct public gaze, they are more likely to be willing to change their minds (Elster, 1998, p. 111).

Dryzek puts the problem this way: "We can note to begin a severe reflection deficit in contemporary parliamentary systems accompanying the partisanship that legislators are expected to show by their parties - and by many of the mostly wealthy individuals, corporations, and groups that fund either parties or individual candidates for office. Partisan legislators rarely change their minds in response to the arguments of those on the other side of an issue – and are unlikely to admit it and act upon it if they do. Where then might we look for reflection, if not in a legislature?" (2017, 612). Wolkenstein might answer, in a political party: "The first and most important conclusion is that deliberation among ordinary party members exhibits many of the characteristics deliberative theorists would like to see present in political discussion. Not only are deliberating groups at the party base are internally diverse and equal. Their exchanges are also marked by the provision of reasons." (2018, 332).

However, this is yet to be empirically tested in the context of ethnically divided societies – is there a difference in the way that ethnic and multiethnic parties in federal systems deliberate, and what is the effect of such differences? This research will seek answer these questions. This project fills a gap in the literature on political parties, and on deliberative democracy, by exploring the linkages between internal party deliberation and ethnic moderation. Despite the considerable potential of democratic deliberations within political parties to moderate extremes in ethnically divided societies, the link has not been explored. One study on within-party deliberation demonstrates an existing capacity that can be harnessed by through linkages between a party base and decision-making (Wolkenstein 2016). Drake & McCulloch (2011) contend that deliberative and consociational democracy overlap, but they do not explore the role of political parties, only that of sequencing. Evidence that multiethnic parties, and multilevel federalism incentivise deliberation in deeply

4

divided societies may help underpin future political party reforms that in turn may contribute ameliorate ethnic conflict and contribute to longer-term democratic stability and development.

Methodology

This project compares ethnic and multiethnic political parties in multiethnic federal systems in Asia in order to test two hypotheses:

- that multiethnic parties have institutional conditions that are more conducive to democratic deliberation than ethnic parties; and
- 2. that parties are more deliberative in practice at the local level than at the national level.

The research proceeded according to three main steps: 1) Coding of a representative sample of political party statues in multiethnic states with federal systems in Asia; 2) identifying/clarifying the internal practices of deliberation and other approaches to decision-making in a subset of those political parties, through elite interviews and other primary sources, and 3) analysing the relationship between different party types (ethnic/multiethnic, large/small, national/regional, established/fledgling), countries and practices of internal democracy.

My sampling approach aimed to have 8-10 parties from each of the four countries (India, Malaysia, Nepal, Myanmar), with even amounts of ethnic and multiethnic parties, and broadly equal amounts of small, medium and large parties (based on their representation and geographical scope). A multiethnic party seeks votes and support from all sectors of society, whereas ethnic parties seek the support of members of their respective ethnic group(s). A party is multi-ethnic if it appeals to, and seeks the votes of, multiple ethnic groups, without excluding any ethnic groups (Chandra 2011). This is indicated by its policy platforms and rhetoric, its selection of leaders and its name (Chandra 2011; Ishiyama and Breuning 2011). In Asia, most non-ethnic parties are in practice the ethnic parties of the dominant group (Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2001).

The first component of the project involved the sourcing and coding of political party constitutions/statues for each party according to the Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes produced by von dem Berge et al (2013). This approach has been demonstrated to give reliable and valid measures of intra-party democracy. The main criticism is that it relies on the analysis of formal documents only, which may miss a significant part of the operations of party, in other words, how a party works in practice. However, in my research, I compare a formal and an informal analysis, so one dimension of comparison is indeed this difference. Another criticism is its inclusion of decentralisation as one dimension of intraparty democracy. Rahat and Shapira (2017) contend that decentralisation and democracy are distinct, and I agree. However, I do not use their

approach because decentralisation important for my purposes, and they rely on informal analysis to create a combined index. The qualitative (informal) analyses are too contextual and rely on the kinds of information that is not available in some of the countries of my focus.

Further, I adapted von dem Berge et al.'s approach to include matters specific to internal deliberation, inclusion and to federalisation. Inclusion here refers to gender, ethnic and religious inclusion (such as through quotas) rather than inclusion of ordinary members in the decision-making process. The party statute coding can thus be considered as a whole, or disaggregated into categories covering decentralisation, voting (aggregative practices), inclusion and internal deliberation. In comparing the outcomes of the coding, controls for democratisation, and the size of the party [are being used]. This conference paper is based on preliminary results.

More than 70 interviews were conducted with political party members in Malaysia, Myanmar, India and Nepal, including former and current party secretaries, Ministers and Members of Parliament, regular branch members, advisors and party workers. In addition, observation of campaign and election activities occurred in India, Malaysia and Nepal. Interview questions were designed to build on the insights of the analysis of the party statutes and to ground truth the conclusions about the statutes. In other words, how does the practice in the party differ or not from that in the statutes – how do they actually work in practice. Specifically:

- How are decisions made, candidates selected, in practice?
- How are different kinds of issues dealt with / deliberated (especially ethnic issues)?
- How are policy issues discussed deliberation, argumentation and resolved voting, consensus etc.?
- How are new policies or policy changes initiated?

During interviews and analysis, a particular focus was given to deliberative practices and the moderating potential in ethnically divided contexts.

Findings

On paper and in practice

It should be no surprise that there are important differences between the practice of parties and the procedures laid out in their statutes. But in the main, they are complied with. The problem is that when the procedures are considered to be likely to result in outcomes that are unsatisfactory to party leaders, the procedures are too often avoided, postponed or cancelled. For example, I was

advised how leader of the Nepali Congress, Shah Bahadur Deuba, steadfastly refused to call a party general convention, despite the requirements to do so under the party statute, because he was likely to lose the leadership and wished to contest the next general election (e.g. Giri 2020). Deuba has also taken to issuing ordinances, rather than go through the established processes. One senior leader complained that "internal democracy in the party has been on the wane, largely due to Deuba, and his unilateral moves are completely against democratic values" (Ram Chandra Poudel, cited in Giri 2020).

Some parties are still developing their institutions and so have relied on informal practices more, usually to their detriment. The National League for Democracy (NLD) in Myanmar has an arrangement where the Chair and Vice Chair of the party cannot be a member of the central executive committee. The party has formal practices that ensure an extent of deliberation and internal democracy, but at the same time, many of the most important decisions and directives are then made by the chair and vice chair outside of these processes undermining its internal democracy. Some described the party as "dictatorial". One NLD informant said that "before everyone had the right to speak, but people did not speak according to the guidelines, so the CEC [Central Executive Committee] changed it [removed the right]".

The merged Nepal Communist Party did not develop its organisational structure and instead it was torn apart by factionalism and dictatorial leadership. At the first Standing Committee meeting in more than a year, Vice Chairs presented a document complaining "The party is yet to be institutionalised. Instead, anarchy is prevailing and there have been incidents of betrayal and counter-betrayal" (Point 7, cited in Pradhan 2019). Indeed, the then Prime Minister (KP Oli) and leader of the (then) Nepal Communist Party was so opposed to letting the democratic run its course (as it would lead to his removal) that he acted to split the party by issuing an Ordinance (Subedi 2020). It was stuck down by the courts, but the party split anyway.

In each of the countries, most especially Myanmar, democratic practices for candidate selection were curtailed by the cost of running, because they often had to be self-funded, and thus the very limited pool of people to select from. I was told that in many cases in Myanmar, the candidate selected was the only one willing to run (see also Tan et al 2020). Candidates are still vetted and need to be approved by higher level authorities before they are selected. The personal cost of running in an election is attributed to an increasing likelihood of political patronage and corruption, especially in Malaysia, as candidates seek to "gain a return on their investment" (interview).

Myanmar's former general and parliamentary speaker, U Shwe Mann, summed up his new party's approach to selecting candidates thusly "The basic policy is that first, the candidates must be natives

of the constituency they are contesting. Second, they must be acceptable to local residents. Third, they must be kind-hearted and altruistic. Fourth, they must be able to realize the policies, objectives and goals of the party." (Shwe Mann, cited in Zaw, Htet Naing. 2020).

One informant described the Malaysian Indian Congress as "run by gangsters". "Cash is king" and with money you can do anything, he explained. Indeed, they quoted the price of votes at 200 Ringgit each (about US\$50). But party members seemed to be actively working against it, lamenting how ingrained it was and that they could not suddenly stop the practice. "It has been going on for 50 years and so will take a long time to change" said another party member.

And, the higher up the party chain someone progresses, the less deliberative parties seem to become. A longstanding senior leader of the Indian National Congress explained to me how he had sought a seat on the party's highest decision-making body, the Central Working Committee. In response, his colleague exclaimed in bewilderment, "why would you want to waste your time on that. All the decisions have already been made beforehand. All you can do is raise your hand when told to" (interview).

Ethnic versus multiethnic parties

There is not a huge amount of difference between political party statutes. This is partly because they are subject to the same requirements according to legislation and for registration, according to which country they are in (or in the case of Malaysia, which state, and in India and Nepal on whether they are national or regional parties). But the differences that are there are all the more important.

Multiethnic parties – and some ethnic parties - proclaim their openness, impartiality and that they represent all peoples and religions. But too often the practice reveals a deep bias towards the interests of one or few groups. "I feel more comfortable with a Muslim leader. I know they understand my feeling. But I have no problem with other religions, and they are all part of our party", said one party worker about his (purportedly) multiethnic party in Malaysia.

Member of minority communities in Myanmar have long held the view that the NLD and the USDP do not live up to their supposed multiethnic ideals. One prominent NLD member states that "We have no hope yet—neither for the NLD nor the USDP—to change the policy for minorities. They are thinking [about] their own power" (cited in Hindstrom 2015). Indeed, the NLD failed to deliver on its promise to federalise and refused to run any Muslim candidates in the 2020 election (Hindstrom 2015).

Other parties are proud to proclaim their ethnic basis. The Chin National Front in Myanmar is one such party. To be a candidate, one must be a Chin national by descent, and "be loyal to the party and

to put Chin nationalism first" (CNF 2020). They also establish hefty fines for resigning or changing party during the term of office. The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in Malaysia is similar – "We are totally devoted to KDM [Kadazan-Dayak-Malay (Indigenous)] rights" said one informant. But it also has policies for the inclusion of youth and women, including a 1/3 reservation. "Women are the backbone of this party. We are very active", described one party worker. Though apparently not in the senior leadership.

Malaysia's parties expressed some desire to move away from communal and ethnic politics but were stuck in the system that effectively required it. For example, the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and the Malaysian Chinese Association informants advised that they must "negotiate hard" for the rights of their communities in the face of a UNMO dominated coalition that still propagates ethnically biased policies and a vision of a Malay dominated state. As one MIC leader advised, "as much as people want to move away communal politics, the policies are still communal" (interview).

Within-party deliberation

Evidence of deliberative practices in party statutes is hard to find, and its presence is no guarantee that it occurs. The Democratic Action Party in Malaysia, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Shan National League for Democracy (Myanmar) have explicit rules and requirements for deliberation, including that all members/delegates entitled to speak, rules for manner or form of speech and that speakers get a right of reply. The SAPP in Malaysia includes a code of ethics for all its members, though it includes matters such as "obey the party's orders".


However, there is sometimes an apparent trade-off in the objective to reach decisions through deliberation and consensus-building and internal democratic procedures. Those that rely more on voting for positions and platforms, can be seen to be less deliberative. Those that emphasise deliberation in their procedures and practices do not need to rely on voting. In other words, there are opportunities to interrogate an issue, and input to the policy-making process, but the decisions are firm and imposed equally on all. This is especially noticeable in the Democratic Action Party in Malaysia which one person described to me as a "top-down communist style". However, this can be a mask for a more authoritarian style of internal decision-making, where deliberation is not consequential, and many informants agreed this is the case. "In the end, all the important decisions are made by the three main leaders" advised one member of the Nepal Communist Party (UML). Otherwise, interviews revealed that the lower the level of the forum (e.g. Branch versus divisional meetings), the higher the level of deliberation in practice.


When it comes to ethnic issues, most parties discuss ethnicity openly in their meetings, but they are less deliberative than on other less controversial matters. Ethnic parties have more established ethnic objectives and so there is less scope to deliberate these matters. Multiethnic parties are concerned to not inflame ethnic divisions and tend to say they try to refrain from talking about ethnic issues in public.

Cultural factors seem also important. According to one party member, "Indians are naturally very expressive and take issues personally – sometimes for us it is a decision of life or death". In other words, deliberation can quickly become personal and descend into argumentation. In the south of Nepal, one informant mentioned that "here, the culture is very passionate, so we have lots of argumentation. It is different in the city". One ethnic party in Myanmar advised that "our culture is to argue, but it depends on how you set up the debate structure. We try to have a moderator, so all people get the chance to speak and present their ideas". Many of the smaller parties take a problem solving approach. "We ask the local levels for a list of their problems. And then we try to solve them."

Internal democracy - comparisons


When quantifying the results [preliminary coding], the differences between ethnic parties and multiethnic parties is particularly stark (see Appendix 1). As described in Figure 1, multiethnic parties come out on average as considerably more deliberative (85% more deliberative), more democratic (46%), more decentralised (26%) and for more inclusive (159%).





There are differences between countries, as displayed in Figure 2, but these do not diminish the significant difference in the rules and operation of ethnic and multiethnic parties. Nepal's parties all have inclusion provisions beyond those seen in parties in most other countries, though large parties are mandated to do so. In practice they are quite good at representing at the local level all sectors of society (caste, ethnicity, gender). However, at the higher level, the dominant Brahmin Chettri (Khas Arya) elite continue to hold a majority of the positions (see also Hachhethu 2002; 2006). On average Nepal's parties score poorly on three dimensions, resurrecting their overall score due to their higher levels of inclusion. Malaysia's parties are the most deliberative and the most internally democratic. India has the most decentralised parties, which is not surprising given the sheer size of the country.

Figure 2: Comparison between small medium and large ethnic and multiethnic parties in India,



Malaysia, Myanmar and Nepal

However, when it comes to the size of the party, there are important similarities that in some respect are more significant that whether they are ethnic or multiethnic. These are displayed in Figure 3. There is only a small difference on average between large ethnic parties and large multiethnic parties. However, the sample size of large ethnic parties is small. The difference between ethnic and multiethnic parties of the medium size is not so significant. Multiethnic parties on average score better on each dimension than on ethnic parties, but not by so much (average 4.5 to 3.9). But when it comes to small parties, the difference is substantial. Small ethnic parties are the most undemocratic (on the four dimensions) out of all the subcategories (averaging just 1.4), while the small multiethnic parties are the most democratic out of all the subcategories (averaging 6).

This is an important finding. It supports the hypothesis that smaller parties are more likely to be deliberative and internally democratic – but only if they are multiethnic. The opposite is true for

ethnic parties. The smaller they are, it seems, the more likely they are to be personality or tradition based hierarchies, or as some described ethnic party leaders in Sabah and Sarawak, "like chieftains".

This add an extra later to the findings of Bolin *et al.* (2017), that smaller parties are more likely to have a higher level of internal party democracy. This may hold true in the case of multiethnic parties, but the reverse is true for ethnic parties. And the corollary of the hypothesis, that because small(er) ethnic parties are likely to be (more) deliberative, they should therefore be encouraged as one balancing component of federal systems in divided societies, is not supported by this research. There are other reasons for having ethnic parties in federal systems in divided societies (see Breen 2022), but their internal democracy, or local level deliberation is not one of them.




Figure 3: Dimensions of Intra-Party Democracy in India, Malaysia, Myanmar and Nepal - Country

Conclusion

In federal systems in Asia, both ethnic and multiethnic parties are key players. At the central level, large multiethnic parties tend to go into coalition with smaller ethnic parties, many of which are in control or at least prominent at the provincial level (see Breen 2020). This research sought to discover the differences in the way the parties work internally, in particular intra-party democracy and internal deliberation. It was hypothesised that multiethnic parties have conditions that make them more deliberative than ethnic parties, but that parties are more deliberative generally at the local rather than the national level. It proceeded by comparing party statutes and undertaking interviews with party members, officials and leaders. This research is significant because of the moderating effect of deliberation (see Breen and He 2020; Luskin et al. 2014), and because

multiethnic parties are argued to be more moderate than ethnic parties (see Reilly 2006). So, is this the result of deliberation? To an extent, yes.

The research has supported the hypotheses, with one important proviso. That is, on average, ethnic parties are still not very democratic or deliberative even when they are small and operate only at the local level. There are some exceptions, but the differences between small ethnic and small multiethnic parties is substantial. Medium-sized multiethnic parties are also more deliberative and more democratic (internally) than medium-sized ethnic parties, but not by so much. With respect to large parties, there is little difference. But overall, multiethnic parties are far more democratic and deliberative than their ethnic counterparts.

This is not to say that ethnic parties are not an important part of federal systems in Asia. Ethnic parties help to hold large multiethnic parties to account and bring ethnic issues to the table. They provide forms of representation that can ameliorate the likelihood of ethnic minorities finding alternative (violent) means of representing their rights. And they can hold power in provinces and at the local level in their own right. Further, as ethnic parties become more institutionalised, it is likely that they will become less personality based.

The other important conclusion is that there is sometimes a trade-off between aggregative forms of internal democracy, and deliberative forms. When a party is able to address the concerns of its members through deliberation, and in many cases, reach a consensus, voting procedures are not so important. But this is harder the larger the party is, and most of the large parties tend towards voting procedures rather than deliberative procedures. The Democratic Action Party in Malaysia is a notable exception, and it is also a leading voice of moderation in Malaysian politics.

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Appendix 1: Summary of parties along six dimensions

Country	Party	Party Type	Deliberation	Internal Demo.	Decentralisation	Inclusion	Party Size
Myanmar	National League for Democracy	Multiethnic (Bamar)	Med*	Low	Med	Med	Large
	Union Solidarity and Development Party	Multiethnic (Bamar)	Med*	Low	Med	Med	Large
	Chin National League for Democracy	Ethnic (Chin)	Med	Med	Med	Low	Med
	Shan Nationalities League for Democracy	Ethnic (Shan)	High	Med	Med	Low	Med
	People's Party	Multiethnic (Bamar)	High	High	High	Low	Small
	Zo National Regional Development Party	Ethnic (Chin)	Low	Low	Low	Low	Small
	Democratic Party for a New Society	Multiethnic (Bamar)	High	Med	Low	Med	Small
	National Unity Party	Multiethnic (Bamar)	Med	Med	Med	Med	Small
India	Bharatiya Janata Party	Multiethnic (Hindi)	Low	Med	Low	High	Large
	Indian National Congress	Multiethnic (Hindi)	Low	Med	High	Med	Large
	Shiv Sena	Ethnic (Hindi)	Low	Low	Low	Low	Small
	Sikkim Democratic Front	Ethnic (regional)	Low	Low	Med	Low	Small
	Indian Union Muslim League	Ethnic (regional)	Low	Low	Med	Low	Small
	Aam Aadmi Party	Multiethnic (regional)	Med	Med	High	Med	Small
	Janaata Dal (Secular)	Multiethnic (regional)	Low	Med	High	High	Med
	All India Trinamool Congress	Ethnic (Bengali)	Low	Med	High	Med	Med

Country	Party	Party Type	Deliberation	Internal Demo.	Decentralisation	Inclusion	Party Size
	All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	Ethnic (Dravidian)	Low	Low	High	Low	Med
	Communist Party of India (Marxist)	Multiethnic	High	High	High	Low	Small
Nepal	Nepali Congress	Multiethnic (BC)	Low	Low	Med	High	Large
	Nepal Communist Party [merged]	Multiethnic	Low	Low	Med	High	Large
	NCP (United Marxist-Leninist)	Multiethnic (BC)	Med	Low	Low	Med	Large
	Maoist (Centre)	Multiethnic	High	Low	Low	High	Large
	Rastriya Prajatantra Party	Ethnic (Hindu)	Low	Low	Low	High	Small
	Janata Samajbadi Party	Ethnic (Madhesi)	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
	Nepal Workers Peasant Party	Ethnic (Newar)	Med	Med	Med	Low	Small
	Bibeksheel Party	Multiethnic (youth)	Med	Med	High	High	Small
Malaysia	United Malay National Organisation	Ethnic	Med*	Med	Low	Med	Large
	Democratic Action Party	Multiethnic (Chinese)	High	Low	Low	Med	Large
	Malaysia Indian Congress	Ethnic	Med	Low	High	Low	Med
	Malaysian Chinese Association	Ethnic	Med*	Med	Med	Low	Med
	People's Justice Party (PKR)	Multiethnic	Med	Med	Med	Med	Large
	Warisan (Sabah)	Ethnic	High	Med	High	Med	Med
	Sarawak United People's Party	Multiethnic (Chinese)	ТВС	ТВС	ТВС	ТВС	Small

Country	Party	Party Type	Deliberation	Internal Demo.	Decentralisation	Inclusion	Party Size
	Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP)	Multiethnic	Med	Med	High	Low	Small
		(Regional)					
	Parti Gerakan Rakyat	Multiethnic	Med	High	Med	Low	Small
		(Chinese)					

• But higher at the local level